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1. Introduction
Corruption has often been argued to exist because the lack of competition
generates rents that can be illegally appropriated. This general idea has often
led people into thinking that, since increased competition reduces rents, it
also leads to lower corruption. Rose-Ackerman (1996) maintained that ‘In
general any reform that increases the competitiveness of the economy helps
reduce corrupt incentives’.
The goal of this paper is to provide a positive theoretical analysis of the
impact of competition on corruption and show that there are reasons to doubt
that increasing the competitiveness of the environment is guaranteed to lead
to reduced corruption.
We consider a procurement problem and we focus our attention on a situ-
ation in which corruption is likely to prosper, i.e., a case in which the good
to be procured is not homogeneous but can be produced at di6erent quality
levels and in which the agent has superior information about delivered qual-
ity. The previous assumptions imply that, in exchange for a bribe, the agent
can assign the project to a 3rm he favors and hide the fact that it delivers
lower quality than promised.
Taking advantage of existing results on multidimensional mechanism
design, we characterize equilibrium corruption and study how it depends on
the degree of competitiveness of the environment. We identify the e6ects
through which higher competition a6ects corruption and 3nd that, contrary
to conventional wisdom, the total e6ect is everything but clear cut: more
competition may lead to both higher or lower corruption.
To be more speci3c, we consider the impact of increased competition both
in the procurement market and in the market for procurement agents. In the
former case we show that an increase in the number of potential 3rms has
e6ects with di6erent signs and that the net impact is ambiguous. We show
that for speci3c functional forms the net e6ect of the increase in the number
of potential suppliers may well be to increase corruption. In the case of
the market for procurement agents we argue that, if increased competition
implies that the employed procurement agent is more eIcient in verifying
delivered quality, the optimal mechanism will increase corruption pro3tability
and corruption will unambiguously be higher.
In terms of modeling choices our paper is closely related to the exten-
sive literature on optimal procurement mechanisms and in particular to Laf-
font and Tirole (1991), who explicitly consider the impact of corruption.
Since we are interested in the comparative statics of the competitiveness of
the environment, we make use of Che’s (1993) characterization of optimal
mechanisms to generalize the results of La6ont and Tirole (1991) to a case in
which procurement agents and 3rms are heterogeneous in terms of continuous
parameters.
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While in this paper we have chosen to abstract away from dynamic consid-
erations, in Celentani and Ganuza (1999) we take the view that it is important
to also study the dynamics of corruption. To do this we embed a simpli-
3ed version of the setting described in this paper into an in3nite horizon
framework in which two generations of agents overlap at each date and we
study the dynamic response of corruption to both temporary and permanent
shocks to the pro3tability of corruption. In another related paper (Celen-
tani and Ganuza, 2001), we study the impact on equilibrium of the degree
of decentralization of corruption decisions by analyzing the consequences of
allowing agents to coordinate their corruption decisions in such a way as to
maximize their total proceeds.
In terms of goals our paper should be seen as a contribution to a recent
strand of literature that studies the ways in which the degree of compet-
itiveness of the environment a6ects corruption. Bliss and Di Tella (1997)
argue that competition also depends on corruption as the latter a6ects 3rms’
entry decisions and show that the e6ects of increased competition on cor-
ruption are generally ambiguous. La6ont and N’Guessan (1999) consider a
model of regulation in which the agent may be corrupt and in which the
regulator optimally chooses the contract to be o6ered to the regulated 3rm
and to the agent. Increased competition among agents leading to a better
monitoring technology is seen to enlarge the set of parameters for which
corruption may result in equilibrium – a conclusion similar to our result on
increased competition in the market for procurement agents. Ades and Di
Tella (1999) propose a simple model in which a regulation agent may be
corrupt and argue that an increase in competition parameters that lower reg-
ulated 3rms’ equilibrium pro3ts has an ambiguous e6ect on the level of cor-
ruption due to the regulator’s optimal response that changes the agent’s wage
and therefore his incentives to be corrupt. Wei’s (2000) simple theoretical
model suggests that countries with higher ‘natural openness’, i.e., exogenous
factors favoring openness to trade, have more incentives to keep corruption
low.
The relationship between competition and corruption has been the object of
several recent cross-sectional studies. Ades and Di Tella (1997) 3nd that an
active industrial policy increases corruption. Ades and Di Tella (1999) show
some support for the idea that higher levels of openness to trade are associated
to lower corruption levels. La6ont and N’Guessan (1999) 3nd some support
for the same relationship on African data, but when they also include lagged
corruption as a regressor to account for the interdependence of corruption
and competition they 3nd that corruption is decreasing in the openness of
the economy for low historical corruption levels and increasing otherwise.
Wei (2000) shows that ‘natural openness’ explains 60% of cross-sectional
variation in corruption while residual openness factors have no signi3cant
e6ect on corruption.
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While the previous papers can be regarded as providing some support for a
negative relationship between competition and corruption, we believe that the
ambiguity of some of the results of our paper indicates that the sign of this
relationship cannot be determined at the aggregate level. In di6erent words,
our results suggest that the initial evidence on a negative association between
competition and corruption discussed above should not be taken to mean that
any increase in competition is guaranteed to reduce corruption.
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 presents the model.
In Section 3 the optimal mechanism for the procurement process is derived
keeping into account a given probability of corruption and it is shown to
amount to the application of a discretion index. Section 4 derives the payo6
from corrupt behavior and explains how corruption decisions are taken in
the face of a given discretion level. Section 5 combines the previous two
sections to obtain equilibrium corruption. Section 6 presents the main results
of the paper by analyzing how corruption varies with the competitiveness of
the environment. Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
Consider a government agency that has to procure a good that is not homo-
geneous but can be produced according to di6erent speci3cations that can be
summarized by a quality level, q. The good can be produced by any one of
N potential suppliers which have private information about their own costs
of producing quality level q. In the following we will assume that the cost
function of 3rm i = 1; : : : ; N is
Ci(q) = C(q; i) = iq;
where i is to be interpreted as the constant marginal cost of quality which
is known only to 3rm i. Firms are risk-neutral, UFi (p; q) = p − Ci(q), and
maximize expected pro3t. Suppose that the administrator of the agency (in
the following, the principal) is also risk neutral and his utility is increasing
(with diminishing marginal utility) in quality and decreasing in the (gross)
transfer to the supplier, UP(p; q) = V (q)−p; for concreteness we will work
with the speci3c functional form UP(p; q) = log q− p.
This kind of situations has been studied by several authors and the optimal
allocation mechanism has been shown to be a multidimensional one that
values both price and quality, 1 – a type of mechanism that is employed very
frequently by many procurement agencies. 2
1 See, for example, Che (1993), La6ont and Tirole (1991) and Branco (1997).
2 Che (1993) and La6ont and Tirole (1991) refer to examples in which mechanisms are used
that award points to price and other parameters (such as technical characteristics and delivery
dates) and that have been used by the US Department of Defense and US electric utilities.
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Suppose now that, while the principal can set the guidelines for the procure-
ment process by announcing the allocation mechanism that is to be employed,
he is then forced to delegate the execution of the procurement process to an
agent who has superior information on delivered quality. While giving weight
to quality has the desirable eIciency properties described above, it obviously
opens up the opportunity for the agent to be corrupt and favor a particular
3rm bidding a high price on the grounds that it o6ers a technically superior
good.
To describe how the possibility of the agent being corrupt modi3es the
problem we 3nd it convenient to summarize the extensive form as follows.
1. Nature:
(a) Selects the procurement agent’s idiosyncratic cost of becoming cor-
rupt, . It is common knowledge that  is drawn from the uniform
distribution on [0; P].
(b) Selects the marginal costs of quality i for 3rms i = 1; : : : ; N . It is
common knowledge that each i is identically and independently drawn
from the uniform distribution on [; P], i.e.,
f() = 1=( P− ); F() = (− )=( P− ):
2. The procurement agent privately learns his idiosyncratic cost of be-
coming corrupt, . Each 3rm privately learns its marginal cost of producing
quality, i.
3. The procurement agent decides whether to be honest or corrupt. If he
decides to be corrupt, he pays the (sunk) cost  in order to establish a
network of contacts that will then enable him to arrange corrupt transactions.
4. Without observing 3rms’ marginal costs, the agent’s idiosyncratic cor-
ruption cost , or his decision to be corrupt or not, the principal publicly
announces the mechanism to be used.
5. Execution of the procurement process:
H. If the agent decided to be honest, he manages the mechanism honestly.
Firms participate in the mechanism and the winning 3rm is selected, it
receives a transfer and produces the good at a speci3c quality level q.
The agent veri3es that delivered quality is q and certi3es it. 3
3 While the extent to which realized quality might di6er from planned quality as a conse-
quence of random factors might depend on the speci3c project, the assumption that, conditional
on the agent being honest, no moral hazard problem exists between the agent and the 3rms is
made only for expositional convenience. McAfee and McMillan (1987) have shown that in a
model with moral hazard but otherwise identical to ours the optimal contract awards the 3rm
a payment that is linear in realized quality. Allowing for the agents to imperfectly observe
realized quality would only make notation heavier and would not change any of the results of
the paper.
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C. If the agent decided to be corrupt:
(a) He is randomly matched to one 3rm i, learns its marginal cost i,
and demands it a bribe b to be received in exchange for the agree-
ment that the 3rm will be awarded the project under conditions to
be detailed and will be permitted to produce a lower quality, qC .
(b) The 3rm accepts or rejects.
A. If the 3rm accepts, all 3rms participate in the mechanism, but the 3rm
that was matched with the agent is selected as the winner under the
claim that it is the 3rm that, according to the allocation mechanism,
o6ers the best quality=price combination; the 3rm receives a transfer,
produces the good at a lower quality level than speci3ed by the mech-
anism, qC ¡q, and pays out the bribe b to the agent.
The agent veri3es that delivered quality is qC and certi3es it is the one
speci3ed by the allocation mechanism, q.
With probability  the corrupt agreement is detected and in this case
the procurement agent and the 3rm awarded the project are imposed
penalties, BA¿ 0 and BF ¿ 0, respectively. 4
R. If the 3rm rejects, the agent has no additional opportunity to contact
another 3rm and therefore manages the mechanism honestly.
Firms participate in the mechanism and the winning 3rm is selected, it
receives a transfer and produces the good at a speci3c quality level q.
The agent veri3es that delivered quality is q and certi3es it.
To conclude the description we only need to comment on the agent’s pre-
ferences. The agent is assumed to be risk-neutral and we normalize his wage
to 0 so that the agent’s expected income will be 0 unless he plans to be
corrupt in which case it will be equal to the expected bribe minus the id-
iosyncratic corruption cost  minus the expected penalty. 5
In the following subsection we discuss our modeling choices.
2.1. Discussion of the model
In our model we assume that the procurement agent has to decide whether
to be corrupt or not before he observes the mechanism chosen by the prin-
cipal. This assumption together with Assumption 2 below, guaranteeing that,
once the corruption cost  is sunk, corruption always pays o6, implies that
4 Since the principal’s preferences over 3nal outcomes discussed above are independent
of the penalties, these are best thought as non-pecuniary penalties or pecuniary penalties not
accruing to the principal.
5 Since it is standard to assume that an agent who is found to be corrupt is deprived at
least part of his salary, what turns out to be relevant is not the wage the agents gets but the
premium over the wage in alternative employment opportunities. Since the agent is risk neutral,
assuming a positive wage premium is equivalent to having a positive expected penalty. This
implies that normalizing the wage premium to 0 has no impact on qualitative results.
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the principal has no ability to actively in7uence the agent’s decision to be
corrupt or not, and that he regards it as given.
In an alternative formulation the principal could be allowed to play as a
leader and commit to using a certain allocation mechanism prior to the agent
deciding whether to be corrupt or not. In this way the principal would no
longer regard the corruption decision as a given, but would try to in7uence
it in such a way as to maximize his expected surplus.
We view the two setups as two extremes. While we only consider an
irreversible decision to be corrupt or not, the alternative formulation describes
a situation in which the decision to be corrupt has no element of irreversibility
whatsoever – an agent has enough time to decide whether to be corrupt or
not after the awarding mechanism has been announced and before the project
is awarded.
The reasons we consider the current setup as the appropriate modeling
choice are the following: 6
1. Assuming that the decision to be corrupt is taken before observing the
mechanism chosen by the principal translates to a static framework the
idea that the decision to be corrupt has an element of irreversibility. By
this we mean that an agent who decides to be corrupt typically sinks
a 3xed cost to arrange a network of contacts that can then be used for
several transactions. If this is true, the extent to which the principal can
in7uence the agent’s 3nal choice to be corrupt or not in a particular
transaction may be very limited.
2. Given the nature of the problem, we think of the principal not as a
legislator who can credibly set procurement mechanisms rules by decree,
but as an administrator of a procurement agency who, though benevolent,
is in charge for a relatively short period and therefore can do no (much)
better than optimally respond to a decision to be corrupt that is (largely)
independent of the mechanism he will choose to employ.
3. We regard our paper as giving a positive rather than a normative con-
tribution and we therefore believe it is important not to overestimate the
commitment power of public administrators.
Other assumptions of the extensive form (the agent learns the type of the
3rm before making a bribe demand and he is endowed with all the bargaining
power) are made only for the sake of simplicity and are in no way essential
to derive any of our results.
It is also important to stress that we have chosen to specify functional forms
for utility functions and distribution functions to simplify the presentation.
As will be clear later on, the qualitative results we present below can be
6 We want to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out to us the importance of discussing
the alternative formulations above.
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generalized provided that the characterization and the implementation of the
optimal mechanism we present are valid. Section 2 of Che (1993) presents
suIcient conditions on V (·); C(·; ·) and the distribution of 3rms’ types for
this to be true. 7
3. Optimal mechanisms with corruption
This section studies the optimal mechanism for a given probability of the
agent to be corrupt. We 3rst study the optimal procurement mechanism when
the agent is not corrupt. We then specify the outcome of a corrupt transaction.
Finally, we provide the optimal mechanism for a given probability for the
agent to be corrupt.
3.1. The auction with an honest agent
An honest agent simply manages the mechanism he is instructed to employ
and allocates the project accordingly. This observation lets us establish a
reference point adapting to our setting a result of Che (1993), that is itself a
special case of results of La6ont and Tirole (1987), McAfee and McMillan
(1987), and Riordan and Sappington (1987). The proof of Proposition 1 is
nevertheless presented in the appendix as it will be later used in the proof of
Proposition 4.
Proposition 1. In the optimal mechanism; the +rm with the lowest  is se-
lected and it produces quality q0 maximizing V (q)− q − (− )q= log q−
(2− )q.
Proof. See the appendix.
The interpretation of the above proposition is that in the optimal mechanism
the marginal cost of quality is overvalued (since 2−¿ ), or equivalently
that the marginal value of quality is undervalued to reduce the informational
rents.
The next issue to discuss is the implementation of the optimal mechanism.
An analogy with unidimensional auctions naturally focuses attention on the
so-called +rst-score auctions, i.e., auctions in which o6ers, quality – price
pairs, are evaluated according to a prespeci3ed ‘score’ function, the winner is
selected to be the 3rm that o6ered the highest score combination, is required
to produce the quality it o6ered and is paid the price it bid. In the following
7 The assumption that  is uniformly distributed, on the other hand is in no way essential.
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we will show that a 3rst-score auction with an appropriate score function
implements the optimal mechanism. 8
We start by characterizing the equilibrium of 3rst-score auction when the
score function is
S˜(; q; p) =  log q+

2
q− p:
Proposition 2. Under the scoring rule S˜(; q; p)= log q+(=2)q−p; +rms’
symmetric equilibrium o=ers in the +rst-score auction (qE(i; ); pE(i; ))
are
qE(i; ) =
2
2i −  ;
pE(i; ) =
2i
2i −  +
∫ P
i
(
P− s
P− i
)N−1
2
2s−  ds:
Proof. Immediate from Che (1993).
The following corollary provides an additional characterization of the equi-
librium of the above 3rst-score auction.
Corollary 1. Under the scoring rule S˜(; q; p) =  log q + (=2)q − p; the
expected payo= of the winning +rm and +rms’ equilibrium bid price and
quality for all  ∈ [; P] are increasing in :
Proof. Immediate.
The corollary shows that a higher value of , i.e., a higher weight given to
quality in the scoring rule, implies that in equilibrium 3rms will o6er higher
levels of quality together with higher prices but also that the higher value
given to quality will increase the informational rents of the 3rms with lower
marginal costs of producing quality, therefore guaranteeing the winning 3rm
a higher margin over costs.
8 Another class of mechanisms, second-score auctions, di6er from 3rst score auctions in that
the winner is allowed to choose its preferred price – quality combination among the ones that
have the same score as the second highest score o6er. Second-score auctions are known
to implement the optimal mechanism if the same score function is used that makes the
3rst-score-auction optimal. For details, see Che (1993).
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In the following, let 1=min{i}N1=1 denote the 3rst-order statistic of {i}N1=1
(i.e., the minimum over the sample of size N ), let
MN (1) = 1− (1− F(1))N = 1−
(
P− 1
P− 
)N
denote its distribution function and let
Q =
∫ P

[
2
21 − 
]
dMN (1); (1)
P =
∫ P


 21
21 −  +
∫ P
1
(
P− s
P− 1
)N−1
2
2s−  ds

 dMN (1): (2)
Corollary 2. (1) Under the scoring rule S˜(; q; p) the expected winning o=er
of a +rst-score auction (q∗(); p∗()) is
q∗() = E1 [qE(1; )] =
∫ P

qE(1; ) dMN (1);
p∗() = E1 [pE(1; )] =
∫ P

pE(1; ) dMN (1):
(2) Expected winning price and quality are positive linear functions of
; q∗() =Q;p∗() = P:
Proof. See the appendix.
The following proposition that adapts a result in Che (1993) shows that
when the score function is S˜(; q; p) the 3rst-score auction implements the
optimal mechanism, provided that = 12 .
Proposition 3. Under the scoring rule S˜(; q; p) =  log q+ (=2)q−p; with
= 12 ; the +rst-score auction implements the optimal mechanism.
Proof. Immediate from Che (1993).
The interpretation of Proposition 3 is the same as that of Proposition 1.
The score function underestimates the marginal value of quality with respect
to money to limit the informational rents of relatively eIcient 3rms.
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3.2. A corrupt agent
When the procurement agent decides to be corrupt he sinks 3xed cost .
After the principal announces the mechanism to be used, the corrupt agent is
matched with a random 3rm, learns its type and makes it a take-it-or-leave-it
bribe demand in exchange for replacing ex-post its bid with one that guaran-
tees it to be awarded the project with probability 1 and with the understanding
that the 3rm will be allowed to produce an exogeneously given minimal level
of quality qC , 9 lower than the one stated in the winning bid. 10
While it is realistic to assume that the agent has some leeway in mani-
pulating bids, it is also reasonable to assume that its extent is limited as
announcing o6ers with low prior probability might trigger investigations. We
model the agent’s ability to manipulate the bid of 3rm i, by assuming that
the replaced bid will be the equilibrium bid of a type
′ =min
j =i
j − 
(
min
j =i
j
)
;
where (·) satis3es the following conditions:
()¿ 0; ∀ ∈ [; P]; (3)
− ()¿ ; ∀ ∈ [; P]; (4)
∫ P

p∗(− ()) dMN−1() =
∫ P

p∗() dMN (); (5)
9 Notice that all the qualitative results of this paper would also hold if we allowed qC to
be increasing in the quality level of the winning 3rm, provided that this dependence does not
imply that for higher levels of corruption, the principal prefers a higher .
10 A procurement mechanism in the described setting allocates the realization of the project
to one 3rm and makes transfers to possibly more than one 3rm. Despite the fact that in the
absence of corruption there are optimal mechanisms that make payments to 3rms that are not
called to realize the project, in the following we restrict the space of mechanisms the principal
can use to mechanisms that make a transfer only to the 3rm that is awarded the realization of
the project.
This assumption is motivated by the fact that it can be very diIcult to show that a 3rm
that does not carry out a project is not entitled to a given payment, as this would amount to
showing that its true type (e.g., marginal cost) is di6erent from the one implied by its bid.
For this reason we believe that allowing mechanisms that make transfers to 3rms that do not
carry out the project can greatly increase the possibility of corruption and this is, probably, the
reason why they are so infrequent.
Since we restrict attention to mechanisms that make a payment to a 3rm only if this 3rm is
called to realize the project, a corrupt agreement necessarily requires that the 3rm involved is
awarded the project.
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and where p∗() is the transfer to a 3rm of type  if it is awarded the
project with the mechanism chosen by the principal. In other words, the
agent considers the minimum  for 3rms di6erent from 3rm i and replaces
the bid of 3rm i with the equilibrium bid of a 3rm of a type that is lower
than this minimum (condition (3)). Condition (4) guarantees that this bid
is consistent with  ∈ [; P], and condition (5) guarantees that the expected
transfer awarded by a corrupt agent using the proposed rule is equal to the
expected transfer awarded by an honest agent.
The above conditions are meant to represent the constraints that the prin-
cipal’s monitoring activity imposes on the agent’s behavior. Since the prin-
cipal’s monitoring is based on the agent’s announcements, the latter cannot
be statistically inconsistent with prior knowledge of bidder’s marginal costs
without triggering unwanted investigations.
The following assumption summarizes the behavior of an agent who
decides to be corrupt. 11
Assumption 1. Let () satisfy conditions (3)–(5). If an agent decides to be
corrupt, he o6ers the 3rm a (gross) payment equal to p∗(−(); ), where
 is the type of the 3rm which would have otherwise won the auction, and
requires the 3rm to produce quality qC .
3.3. Optimal discretion with corruption
When the principal knows that with probability  the agent is corrupt,
and will therefore allocate resources in the way speci3ed in the previous
subsection, his payo6 function will be
(1− )(V (q)− p) + (V (qC)− pC);
where qC is the exogenously 3xed quality level under corruption, and pC
denotes the transfer to the winning 3rm under corruption, which under As-
sumption 1, is equal to p∗(− (); ).
The next proposition generalizes Proposition 1 by characterizing the optimal
mechanism when the agent is believed to be corrupt with a given probability.
To do this we use the fact that, given corrupt agreements are assumed to take
place before 3rms play according to the procurement mechanism, 3rms that
have not been contacted by the agent play strategies that are independent of
11 Assumption 1 describes the outcome of corruption given the assumption that the principal
chooses a mechanism that makes transfers only to the 3rm that is awarded the project that was
discussed in footnote 10. If the principal chose a mechanism that allows transfers to 3rms other
than the one that is awarded the project, it would probably be reasonable to give a di6erent
description of the outcome of corruption. As was argued in footnote 10, however, the use of
this kind of mechanisms in a setting in which corruption may take place seems unreasonable.
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the probability for the agent to be corrupt, or in other words play the same
strategies as in a mechanism with an honest agent. 12
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1, in the optimal mechanism, if the agent
is honest; the +rm with the lowest  is selected and it produces quality q0
maximizing (1− )V (q)− q− (− )q= (1− ) log q− (2− )q.
Proof. See the appendix.
The following proposition shows that in order to implement the optimal
mechanism with a 3rst-score auction the principal has to set a score function
whose discretion index is decreasing in the probability of the agent being
corrupt:
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 1 the +rst-score auction with score func-
tion S˜(; q; p) =  log q + ( = 2)q − p with  = (1 − )=2 implements the
optimal mechanism.
Proof. Straightforward from Propositions 2 and 4.
As a consequence of Proposition 4 we have:
Corollary 3. Suppose Assumption 1 is satis+ed; that the agent is corrupt
with probability  and that the principal chooses a +rst-score auction with
the optimal scoring rule. Then; irrespective of whether the agent is honest
or corrupt; expected equilibrium quality and price will be q∗()=Q(1−)=2
and p∗() = P(1− )=2.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 5.
The above corollary formalizes Ban3eld’s (1975) view that ‘narrowing
discretion [ : : : ] while preventing the agent from doing (corrupt) things that
are slightly injurious to the principal it may at the same time prevent him
from doing (non-corrupt) ones that would be very bene3cial to him. If simply
to prevent corruption an agent is given a narrower discretion than would
be optimal if there were no corruption, whatever losses are occasioned by
his having a sub-optimal breadth of discretion must be counted as costs of
preventing corruption’ (Ban3eld, 1975, p. 590).
12 If corruption could take place after the bidding, the fact that 3rms know that the public
oIcial may be corrupt implies that they may want to bid in such a way as to increase the
probability to be selected as partners in the corrupt transaction or in such a way as to increase
their payo6 if selected.
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4. The decision to be corrupt
Suppose the procurement mechanism chosen by the principal is given. If
the agent decides to be honest he gets a payo6 of 0 with probability 1. If
he decides to be corrupt he sinks the idiosyncratic corruption cost , gets
a bribe from the 3rm he is colluding with and pays a penalty if detected;
the next subsection is dedicated to computing the expected payo6 from being
corrupt. In Section 4.2 we equate the payo6s from being honest and getting
corrupt to determine for what values of  the agent decides to be corrupt for
a given procurement mechanism.
4.1. Bargaining over a bribe
A critical issue in the study of corruption refers to the way in which the
partners of a corrupt agreement are selected and in particular to whether one
should expect an eIcient matching to take place or not. In our setting this
concern translates to analyzing how the marginal cost of producing quality
a6ects the surplus appropriated by the partners of a corrupt transaction via
its direct in7uence on the cost of producing a minimally acceptable level of
quality (qC) and its indirect in7uence on the 3rm’s disagreement payo6 via
its expected payo6 from participating in the auction. 13
While the analysis of this kind of problem is complicated by the fact that
corrupt transactions are arranged according to no rule but, rather, in violation
of existing rules (which in turn implies that they can be organized in a
variety of di6erent ways), we believe that the illegal and therefore secret
nature of corruption implies that a party potentially interested in corruption
cannot rely on a public mechanism to elicit private information from all
possible corruption partners and will therefore be matched with ineIcient
partners with positive probability.
In light of the above discussion we assume that by paying the idiosyncratic
cost  ∈ [0; P], the agent is matched with a randomly selected 3rm and
learns its marginal cost , or, equivalently, its willingness to enter a corrupt
agreement. For the sake of simplicity as we stated in Assumption 1 we also
assume that the quality the corrupt 3rm will have to provide is exogenously
13 Some authors (e.g., Beck and Maher, 1986; Lien, 1986, 1987) consider the case in which
the procurement price is given and 3rms bid their bribes to be awarded the project. The
equilibrium of this game is equivalent to the equilibrium of the game in which 3rms bid
procurement prices. In both cases the most eIcient 3rm is awarded the project and equilibrium
payo6s are identical. In these situations corruption only determines a di6erent distribution of
surplus between the principal and the agent. We think that these models have the drawback of
not considering the optimal response of the principal and of assuming that a public mechanism,
like an auction, can be used to carry out illegal transactions.
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given. Finally we assume the procurement agent makes a take-it-or-leave-it
bribe demand to the 3rm. 14
Given the agent makes a take-it-or-leave-it demand to the 3rm, the bribe
he will demand is easily determined by the equality of 3rm’s payo6s from
accepting and rejecting the o6er. Let F(; ) denote the expected agreement
payo6 from a corrupt transaction to a type  3rm. This payo6 is a function
of its realized compensation, which, being equal to the price of the expected
winning o6er, is a function of the discretion index , and of the cost of
producing quality qC which depends on the 3rm’s marginal cost of producing
quality :
F(; ) = p∗()− b− qC − BF;
or, in words, the expected price the 3rm gets paid minus the bribe, minus
the cost of producing quality qC , minus the expected penalty.
Let dF(; ) denote type  3rm’s payo6 if it rejects the agent’s demand
(its disagreement payo6 ) when discretion  is used in the auction. Recall that
we assumed that if the 3rm rejects the o6er of the procurement agent, the
latter has no further opportunities to get corrupted and therefore manages the
auction as he would have if he had decided to be honest. Given this, a type 
3rm’s disagreement payo6 will simply be its expected payo6 in an auction
without corruption:
dF(; ) =

 ∫ P

(
P− s
P− 
)N−1
2
2s−  ds

( P− 
P− 
)N−1
;
where the 3rst term denotes the pro3t conditional upon winning the auction
and the second the probability of winning the auction.
The take-it-or-leave-it equilibrium bribe can now be easily derived from
the 3rm’s participation constraint in the corruption agreement
F(; ) = dF(; )
which implies that the equilibrium bribe paid by the 3rm to the agent is
b= p∗()− BF − qC − dF(; ) (6)
Consider now the expected payo6 to the agent (gross of ):
A = b− BA: (7)
For Eq. (6) to be an admissible solution, it is necessary that A=b−BA¿ 0,
or otherwise the agent prefers not to make any o6er to the 3rm. It is easy to
show that for this to happen it is necessary and suIcient that the expected
surplus the agent and the 3rm generate once the match is established (gross
14 The result is identical for any bargaining procedure that assigns a payo6 to the agent that
is positive and increasing in the surplus that corruption creates.
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of  which is a sunk cost) but before the realization of the types of the other
3rms are known, is positive for all possible types of the corrupt 3rm:
p∗()− (BF + BA)− qC − dF(; )¿ 0:
Assumption 2 below guarantees that this condition is satis3ed in the Nash
equilibrium of the game.
Let
A=
∫ P




∫ P

(
P− s
P− 
)N−1
2
2s−  ds

( P− 
P− 
)N−1 1
P− d
and
k =
1
P
[
P+ 
2
qC + (BF + BA)
]
; (8)
"=
1
P
[(P − A)]: (9)
Assumption 2. Let ˆ = (1 + k)=(2 + "). For all  ∈ [; P]; p∗(ˆ) − (BF +
BA)− qC − dF(ˆ; )¿ 0.
Section 5 shows that ˆ is the equilibrium value of discretion when As-
sumption 2 is satis3ed. It is easy to see that, given that ˆ is bounded away
from 0 and dF(ˆ; ) tends to 0 as N tends to in3nity, there exist parameter
values such that Assumption 2 is satis3ed.
Before concluding, it is important to remark that the bribe in Eq. (6) is
the bribe the agent will receive conditional on a particular type of 3rm and
therefore not the expected bribe he anticipates when deciding whether to be-
come corrupt, i.e., whether to be randomly matched with a 3rm as a potential
corruption partner. The excepted payo6 from corruption will be introduced
in the next subsection where the agent’s decision to become corrupt will be
analyzed.
4.2. The probability of corruption
Having de3ned the agent’s payo6 when he behaves honestly and when he
decides to get corrupted, we now want to compute the probability that an
agent with a corruption cost  drawn from a uniform distribution decides
to get corrupted when he is supposed to allocate a project according to a
3rst-score auction with scoring rule S˜(; q; p) de3ned above. To do that we
need to compute the probability that for a given  the corruption cost of
the agent will be suIciently low for him to get corrupted, or equivalently
the type ∗ who is exactly indi6erent between being honest and corrupt. In
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order to do that we 3rst need to compute the expected payo6 from becoming
corrupt using the results of the previous subsection. Substituting Eq. (6) into
Eq. (7) we get the agreement payo6 to an agent from arranging a corrupt
transaction with a 3rm of type  when the discretion index of the auction is :
A(; ) = p∗()− BF − qC − dF(; )− BA:
Computing the expected value of A(; ) with respect to  we obtain the
agent’s expected agreement payo6 when the discretion index to be used in the
auction is . From Corollary 2 we know that p∗()=P. The expected value
of qC is simply ( P+)qC=2 and the expected value of dF(; ) can be easily
shown to be A. We can now compute type  agent’s excepted payo6 from
becoming corrupt when the discretion index to be used in the auction is :
E[A(; )]− = P− BF −
P+ 
2
qC − A− BA − : (10)
Equating the right-hand side of (10) to 0 (the normalized payo6 from being
honest) and rearranging we get
∗ = (P − A)− (BF + BA)−
P+ 
2
qC: (11)
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of Eq. (11) and sum-
marizes the main result of this section:
Proposition 6. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satis+ed and let ∗=(P−A)−
(BF + BA) − ( P + )=2qC . Then; the probability the agent gets corrupted;
; is
=
{
∗= P if ∗¡ P;
1 otherwise:
5. Equilibrium
Although we will omit a reference to it, in the rest of the paper we will
implicitly make Assumptions 1 and 2. The following proposition provides the
equilibrium values of discretion and the probability corruption.
Proposition 7. In equilibrium
ˆ=
1+ k
2 + "
; (12)
ˆ=
" − 2k
2 + "
: (13)
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Fig. 1. Equilibrium.
Proof. Immediate from Propositions 5 and 6 and recalling the de3nition of
k and " in Eqs. (8) and (9).
Fig. 1 summarizes the result by depicting the best response of the principal
(parametrized by the discretion index ) to a given probability for the agent
to be corrupt, , and the best response to the agent (parametrized by the
probability he gets corrupted, , prior to knowing his corruption cost, ) to
a given discretion index . The intersection of the best responses provides
equilibrium discretion and probability of corruption.
It is important to clarify at this point that, as was spelled out in Section 2,
we are describing a situation in which the agent decides whether to be corrupt
before the principal chooses the procurement mechanism and the principal
decides on the procurement mechanism without observing whether the agent
has decided to be corrupt. This implies in particular that the principal chooses
the procurement mechanism based on his expectation of the decision to be
corrupt which he considers to be given. With this setup the reason why the
principal chooses a lower discretion index when he believes the agent is
corrupt with probability  is that the expected marginal value of quality q is
decreasing in  as quality q is only delivered with probability 1− .
The following proposition provides the comparative statics of the equilib-
rium.
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Proposition 8. The discretion index (probability of corruption) is increasing
(decreasing) in ; BF ; BA; qC and P.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 8 shows that the larger the penalty, the monitoring probability,
the minimal quality to be provided under corruption, the lower the expected
payo6 of being corrupt and therefore, the lower the probability of corruption.
On the other hand, it also shows that the larger the support of the matching
cost, the larger is the average matching cost, the lower the expected payo6
of being corrupt and, therefore, the lower the probability of corruption.
We believe that the fact that the comparative statics results presented in the
Proposition 8 concord with common intuition provides support for the model
we presented as a reasonable description of the way corruption decisions are
taken in equilibrium and as a useful tool to study the relationship between
corruption and competition. The next section turns to this analysis.
6. Competition and corruption
The goal of this section is to explore the relationship between corrup-
tion and competition. More speci3cally we will be interested in the impact
on equilibrium corruption of the number of potential suppliers (procurement
market competition) and of competition in the market for agents (procurement
agents market competition).
6.1. Competition in the procurement market and corruption
In this subsection we want to study the impact of an increase in the com-
petitiveness of the procurement market on the equilibrium. In the incomplete
information setting proposed in this paper a natural exercise is to consider the
impact of an increase in the number of potential suppliers. This can be shown
to lead to lower markups in equilibrium bidding functions, lower expected
pro3t for any type of 3rm, and lower expected equilibrium unit price.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the next proposition shows that when
competition among suppliers increases as a consequence of the increase of
their number, corruption may increase. Proposition 9 in fact shows that cor-
ruption is increasing in competition for the given functional forms we have
chosen. Since Proposition 9 does not generalize under the conditions in Sec-
tion 2 of Che (1993), it should be stressed that we consider Proposition 9 as
an e6ective way of demonstrating that increased competition in the procure-
ment market does not necessarily imply lower corruption.
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Proposition 9. The discretion index (probability of corruption) is decreasing
(increasing) in N.
Proof. See the appendix.
The proof of Proposition 9 is instructive in the sense that identi3es the three
forces that determine whether the ultimate impact on corruption is positive
or negative. To do this we use the following result.
Lemma 1. For a given ; the expected transfer to the winning +rm is inde-
pendent of N.
Proof. See the appendix.
Notice that Lemma 1 does not say that the price per unit of quality is
constant in N . As a matter of fact the price per unit of quality is decreasing
in N as a consequence of both the lower expected minimum cost realization
and of the lower informational rents implied by tougher competition.
By the same token, however, the lower expected unit cost of quality implies
that the mechanism chosen by the principal in equilibrium will be such that
the expected procured quality will be higher. Summarizing, while the lower
expected unit cost tends to decrease the expected total transfer to the winning
3rm, the higher expected procured quality tends to increase the expected total
transfer to the winning 3rm. With the functional forms and the distribution
we have chosen, the two e6ects turn out to exactly cancel out each other to
leave the expected total transfer to the winning 3rm as constant in N .
From Lemma 1 it should be clear that in the case we concentrate on, the
net impact of a higher N turns out to be the one implied by the reduction
in 3rms’ disagreement payo6s, dF(; ), which depends on the fact that the
expected payo6 if the agent behaves honestly is lower the higher N . Since
this implies that the procurement agent appropriates a higher share of the
surplus if he decides to be corrupt, being corrupt will be optimal for an
agent with a higher cost  and the probability of corruption will be higher.
The impact of the result in Lemma 1 is summarized in Fig. 2, in which it
is shown that the agent’s best response to any given discretion level, , shifts
to the right, so that in the new equilibrium the probability of corruption will
be higher (ˆ′¿ˆ) and discretion lower (ˆ
′
¡ˆ). It is interesting to note that
while more competition (in the sense of a larger N ) implies more corruption,
it is also true that more corruption implies more competition (in the sense of
lower expected payo6s for 3rms). Given a higher probability of corruption
implies that the principal chooses a mechanism assigning lower weight to
quality, the higher the probability of corruption, the more similar to each other
3rms will be, in the sense that 3rms with lower marginal costs of producing
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Fig. 2. Corruption with increased competition in the procurement market.
quality will have a lower advantage over 3rms with higher marginal costs.
From Proposition 5 and Corollary 2 it is easy to see that, when corruption
is higher,  is lower and the expected net transfer to any one 3rm is lower.
Although the result of Proposition 9 depends on the speci3ed functional
forms, it highlights the impact of larger numbers of 3rms when the principal
reacts to the expected probability of corruption. In general we can see that
the e6ects of a larger N are the following:
1. The expected marginal cost of producing quality and the informational
rents of the winning 3rm are lower, and the expected transfer per unit
of quality to the winning 3rm is lower.
2. The lower expected marginal cost of producing quality implies a higher
expected quality being supplied by the winning 3rm.
3. The expected payo6 to a 3rm when the agent behaves honestly and
therefore its disagreement payo6 when bargaining with a corrupt agent
is lower.
Notice that in general from 1 and 2 it is not possible to say whether the
expected total transfer to the winning 3rm is higher or lower with a larger
number of 3rms as the e6ects discussed in 1 and 2 tend to, respectively, de-
crease and increase the total transfer to the winning 3rm. This in turn implies
that it is not possible to say whether tougher competition (parametrized by a
higher N ) leads to lower or higher corruption.
Lemma 1 on the other hand shows that, in the case we have concentrated
on, the e6ects discussed in 1 and 2 exactly cancel out each other so that the
sign of the net e6ect is determined by the e6ect discussed in 3 that implies
that a larger number of 3rms decreases the reservation level of 3rms when
they bargain with a corrupt agent and therefore leads to higher corruption.
Notice also that we only have considered the possibility of an exogenous
penalty for the 3rm, BF , but that it could be sensible to consider the impact
of the possibility of excluding 3rms that have been found to be corrupt. Since
this punishment is stronger the higher the expected equilibrium payo6s and
therefore the lower the number of potential suppliers, it provides an additional
reason why an increase in the number of potential suppliers may lead to an
increase in corruption.
Before concluding this section we want to stress that, the fact that more
competition may imply higher corruption does not necessarily imply that more
competition is undesirable from the point of view of the principal. Since more
corruption is harmful for the principal but increased competition is bene3cial
to him when the agent is honest, the comparison in general, is ambiguous.
6.2. Competition in the market for procurement agents and corruption
In the model we have presented, we assumed for the sake of simplicity
that the procurement agent could verify procured quality at zero cost. Our
results easily generalize to situations in which the procurement agent bears
a cost of certifying that delivered quality is q which is equal to )q, with
)¿ 0 observable. In this subsection we consider this kind of situation and
we analyze how increased competition in the market for procurement agents
a6ects corruption. To do this we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 3. If the 3rm that is awarded the realization of the project is
supposed to provide quality q; the agent’s cost of verifying quality is )q;
regardless of whether the 3rm provided quality q or quality qC (in the case
the 3rm and the procurement agent reached a corrupt agreement).
Assumption 4. The procurement agent’s ability, 1=), is observable.
Assumption 5. Increased competition in the market for procurement agents
implies that the employed procurement agent has higher ability (i.e., lower
marginal cost of verifying procured quality).
Under Assumptions 3 and 4 it is easy to see that, when no corruption is
possible, in equilibrium the 3rm with the lowest marginal cost of producing
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quality is assigned the realization of the project and it provides quality q′0
maximizing V (q) − (2 − )q − )q. In other words, since higher procured
quality implies higher veri3cation costs, procured quality will be lower than
in the case with zero veri3cation costs.
Assumption 5 can be thought as representing a situation in which removing
barriers to entry 15 into employment in a public procurement agency implies
that the average quality of employed procurement agents is higher while the
salary is unchanged.
The next proposition states that stronger competition in the market for
procurement agents implies higher corruption.
Proposition 10. Under Assumptions 3–5 the discretion index (probability of
corruption) is lower (higher) the stronger the competition in the market for
procurement agents.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 10 is the following. Tougher competition
in the market for procurement agents implies a higher ability of the employed
procurement agent. Given the procurement agent has an observable higher
ability, for any given probability of corruption, the optimal mechanism has to
discount a lower additional cost of quality ()q is lower). Since this increases
the pro3tability of corruption, the agent will be more inclined to corruption
for any given . This is represented in Fig. 3, where the best response of
the agent for two di6erent values of ) is represented. Given )1¡)0, the best
response for )1 lies to the right of the best response for )0, and the associated
equilibrium levels of discretion and the probability of corruption are such that
ˆ1¡ˆ0, and ˆ1¿ˆ0, as claimed by Proposition 10. For comparison purposes,
Fig. 3 also depicts the limit case in which ) = 0, which corresponds to the
equilibrium analyzed in Section 5.
It is important to stress that, as in the previous case, an increase in com-
petition in the market for procurement agent has an ambiguous e6ect on the
principal’s welfare: while he has to reimburse a lower cost to the agent and
the optimal mechanism implies higher utility when the agent is honest, these
e6ects may be outweighed by the higher probability of the agent being corrupt
in equilibrium. 16
The result of Proposition 10 is the same as the one proposed by La6ont
and N’Guessan (1999) although the underlying reason is di6erent. In our case,
15 Examples include legal degree requirements, professional aIliations, or citizenship require-
ments.
16 Notice that this ambiguity depends on the assumption that the procurement agent decides
whether to be corrupt before the principal announces the allocation mechanism to be used.
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Fig. 3. Corruption with increased competition in the market for procurement agents.
when increased competition in the market for procurement agents selects
a more eIcient agent, the opportunity cost of reducing his discretion is higher.
Since higher discretion implies higher pro3tability of corruption a higher
probability of corruption ensues in equilibrium.
Before concluding, we want to consider the possibility that increased com-
petition implies a lower wage for the procurement agent. Including wages in
our model can be easily seen to deliver the standard result that a positive
procurement wage di6erential with respect to wages in an alternative employ-
ment acts as a corruption deterrence. This in turn means that, if increased
competition implies a lower wage di6erential, it then implies higher corrup-
tion, while if increased competition in the labor market at large implies lower
wages, but unchanged wage di6erentials, no impact on corruption arises.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we pursued it has two di6erent and related goals: To study
the link between corruption and optimal procurement mechanisms and, taking
advantage of the former, to explore the relationship between competition and
corruption.
We showed that the possibility of corruption decreases the expected value
of awarding a larger weight to quality and therefore of relying on the
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procurement agent’s ability to verify procured quality. In other words, keep-
ing into account the optimal regulatory response, the possibility for the agent
to be corrupt implies that in equilibrium he is awarded less discretion.
Based on this we studied how corruption is a6ected by increased compe-
tition and in particular we asked the following questions:
1. What are the consequences of a larger number of potential suppliers in
the procurement market?
2. What are the consequences of increased competition in the market for
procurement agents?
Our analysis shows that it may well be that corruption is higher in a more
competitive environment. This is not to say that increases in competition are
not desirable, as in fact they may be bene3cial, but to highlight that a cost
associated with tougher competition may be higher corruption and that it is
reasonable to expect that corruption and competition will grow together in
certain markets.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. By the Revelation Principle we can restrict without
loss of generality to direct revelation mechanisms. Let q(); p(); *() denote
respectively the vectors denoting quality levels, transfers, and probability of
being awarded the project of each one of the N 3rms. Let, i = 1; : : : ; N ,
vi(*i(i; −i); qi(i; −i); i) = *i(i; −i)iqi(i; −i) (A.1)
and let
Vi(′i ; i) = E−i [pi(
′
i ; −i)− vi(*i(′i ; −i); qi(′i ; −i); i)]:
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The optimal mechanism is then a solution to the following program:
max
q();p();*()
E
[
N∑
i=1
*i() log qi()−
N∑
i=1
pi()
]
s.t.
Vi(i; i)¿ 0; ∀i ∈ [; P]; ∀i ∈ N;
Vi(i; i)¿Vi(′i ; i); ∀i; ′i ∈ [; P]; ∀i ∈ N;
*i()¿ 0 and
N∑
i=1
*i()6 1; ∀ ∈ [; P]: (A.2)
Let
Ui(i) =Vi(i; i); (A.3)
then we can rewrite the principal’s objective function as
R= E
[
N∑
i=1
*i() log qi()−
N∑
i=1
vi(*i(); qi(); i)
]
−
N∑
i=1
Ei [Ui(i)]:
(A.4)
From the envelope theorem
dUi
di
=−E−i
[
@
@i
vi(*i(i; −i); qi(i; −i); i)
]
=−E−i [*i(i; −i)qi(i; −i)]
and integrating we get
Ui(i) =Ui( P) +
∫ P
i
E−i [*i(˜i; −i)qi(˜i; −i)] d˜i: (A.5)
Since the principal’s utility is decreasing in Ui( P), at the optimum Ui( P)=0.
Then from (A.5)
Ei [Ui(i)] =
∫ P

[∫ P
i
E−i [*i(˜i; −i)qi(˜i; −i)] d˜i
]
f(i) di:
Integrating by parts,
Ei [Ui(i)] =
[[∫ P
i
E−i [*i(˜i; −i)qi(˜i; −i)] d˜i
]
F(i)
] P

+
∫ P

E−i [*i(˜i; −i)qi(i; −i)]F(i) di:
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Since [[∫ P
i
E−i [*i(˜i; −i)qi(˜i; −i)] d˜i
]
F(i)
] P

= 0
multiplying and dividing by the density function f(i), we obtain
Ei [Ui(i)] =
∫ P

E−i [*i(i; −i)qi(i; −i)]
F(i)
f(i)
f(i) di
= E
[
*i(i; −i)qi(i; −i)
F(i)
f(i)
]
and substituting F(i)=f(i) = (i − ) into the above expression we obtain
Ei [Ui(i)] = E[(i − )*i()qi()]: (A.6)
Substituting (A.1) and (A.6) into (A.4) and after straightforward computa-
tions we get
R= E
[
N∑
i=1
*i() log qi()−
N∑
i=1
(2i − )qi()*i()
]
:
SuIcient conditions for incentive compatibility condition (A.2) to hold are
that (A.5) holds and that Xi(i)=−E−i [*i(i; −i)qi(i; −i)] is nonincreasing.
Hence the optimal mechanism solves
max
q();*()
E
[
N∑
i=1
*i() log qi()−
N∑
i=1
(2i − )qi()*i()
]
(A.7)
s.t.
*i()¿ 0 and
N∑
i=1
*i()6 1; ∀ ∈ [; P]
Xi(·) nonincreasing:
Maximize (A.7) ignoring the incentive compatibility constraint. This yields
*i() = 1 if and only if i = minj∈Nj and qi(i; −i) ∈ argmaxqi{log qi −
(2i − )qi} ⇔ qi = 1=(2i − )¡ 1=i so that the quality level is ex-post
ineIcient. Given the optimal quality qi(i; −i) and the optimal probability
of assignment *i(i; −i) are nonincreasing, Xi(·) is nonincreasing and the
incentive compatibility constraint is satis3ed.
Proof of Corollary 2. (1) To obtain the claim it suIces to show that in
a 3rst-score auction using S˜(; q; p) as the score function, the 3rm with the
lowest  wins with probability 1 and to then compute expected winning
price and quality it is suIcient to compute the expected quality and price
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using the distribution of the minimum of an N -dimensional sample from
F()=(−)=( P−). To show this replace the equilibrium o6er in the score
function to obtain
S(; ) = S˜(; qE(; ); pE(; ))
= log
2
2− +

2
2
2− −
2
2− −
∫ P

(
P− s
P− 
)N−1
2
2s−  ds
=  log
2
2−  − −
∫ P

(
P− s
P− 
)N−1
2
2s−  ds: (A.8)
Using Leibniz’s rule to di6erentiate S(; ) in Eq. (21) with respect to  we
get
@S(; )
@
=− 2
2−  + 
(
P− 
P− 
)N−1
2
2− 
− 
∫ P

(N − 1)
(
P− s
P− 
)N−2 P− s
( P− )2
2
2s−  ds
=−
∫ P

(N − 1)
(
P− s
P− 
)N−2 P− s
( P− )2
2
2s−  ds¡ 0
which implies that the score assigned to 3rms with lower marginal costs of
producing quality is higher and concludes the proof of the 3rst part. (2)
immediate from (1) and Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. The optimal mechanism with corruption is the solu-
tion to
max
q();p();*()
(1− )E
[
N∑
i=1
*i() log qi()−
N∑
i=1
pi()
]
+ (log qC − pC)
s.t.
Vi(i; i)¿ 0; ∀i ∈ [; P]; ∀i ∈ N;
Vi(i; i)¿Vi(′i ; i); ∀i; ′i ∈ [; P]; ∀i ∈ N;
*i()¿ 0 and
N∑
i=1
*i()6 1; ∀ ∈ [; P]:
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Since by Assumption 1 the maximand is equal to
E
[
(1− )
N∑
i=1
*i() log qi()−
N∑
i=1
pi()
]
+  log qC
the problem is identical to the one without corruption with the only di6erence
that log q is replaced by (1 − ) log q and the solution is the one given in
Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 8. From ˆ= (1+k)=(2+"), we get dˆ=da= @ˆ=@k @k=@a
¿ 0 for all a ∈ {BA; BF ; ; w; qC}, given @ˆ=@k ¿ 0 and @k=@a¿ 0. From
ˆ=
" − 2k
2 + "
=
(P − A)− 2
[
P+
2 qC + (B
F + BA)
]
2 P+ (P − A) ;
we get dˆ=d P¡ 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Since from Corollary 2 the expected procurement price
(expected transfer to the winning 3rm) is p∗()=P, it is suIcient to show
that @P=@N = 0.
From Proposition 3 when  = 12 the 3rst-score auction implements the
optimal procurement mechanism without corruption. Thus the principal’s ex-
pected surplus has to be the same in both mechanisms. Recalling we denote
by 1 =min{i}Ni=1, the 3rst-order statistic of , the optimal mechanism gives
the principal the following expected surplus:
W ∗ = E1 [log q0(1)− (21 − )q0(1)]:
The 3rst-score auction gives the principal the following expected surplus:
WFS = E1
[
log qE
(
1;
1
2
)
− pE
(
1;
1
2
)]
where
qE
(
i;
1
2
)
=
1
2i −  ;
pE
(
i;
1
2
)
=
i
2i −  +
∫ P
i
[
P− s
P− i
]N−1
1
2s−  ds:
From W ∗ =WFS and q0(i) = qE(i; 12 ), we obtain
E1 [(21 − )q0(1)] = E1
[
pE
(
1;
1
2
)]
=
1
2
P:
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Substituting q0(1) = 1=(21 − ), we get
E1
[
(21 − ) 121 − 
]
= 1=
1
2
P
and P is shown to be independent of N .
Proof of Proposition 9. Since ˆ= (" − 2k)=(2 + ") we have dˆ=dN =(@ˆ=
@")(@"=@N ). Notice that @ˆ=@"¿ 0. Moreover since @P=@N = 0 and @A=@N
¡ 0, from "=(1= P)[(P−A)] we get @"=@N ¿ 0 which together with @ˆ=@"
¿ 0 implies dˆ=dN ¿ 0.
Proof of Proposition 10. Under Assumptions 3 and 4 the equilibrium ex-
pressions are the same as (12) and (13) with the only di6erence that the
constant " is replaced by
"′ =
1
P
∫ P


 2
2+ )−  +
∫ P

(
N − 1
N
)( P− s
P− 
)N−1
2
2s+ )−  ds


× NP− 
(
P− 
P− 
)N−1
d:
Since it is easy to check that "′ is decreasing in ), and the equilibrium
probability of corruption ˆ′ is increasing in "′, it is immediate to recognize
that under Assumption 5 corruption is increasing in the competition in the
market for procurement agents.
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